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Essay
Using Evidence to Combat Overdiagnosis and
Overtreatment: Evaluating Treatments, Tests, and
Disease Definitions in the Time of Too Much
Ray Moynihan1*, David Henry2,3, Karel G. M. Moons4
1Centre for Research in Evidence-Based Practice, Bond University, Robina, Queensland, Australia, 2University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 3 Institute for Clinical
Evaluative Sciences, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 4 Julius Center for Health Sciences and Primary Care, University Medical Centre Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands
While a large part of the world’s
population faces the problems of under-
diagnosis and undertreatment, it is appar-
ent that a ‘‘modern epidemic’’ of overdi-
agnosis afflicts high-income countries [1],
with tangible human and financial costs of
the unnecessary management of overdiag-
nosed diseases [2,3]. While there is
ongoing debate about how to best describe
the problem, narrowly defined, overdiag-
nosis occurs when increasingly sensitive
tests identify abnormalities that are indo-
lent, non-progressive, or regressive and
that, if left untreated, will not cause
symptoms or shorten an individual’s life.
Such overdiagnosis leads to overtreatment
when these ‘‘pseudo-diseases’’ are conven-
tionally managed and treated as if they
were real abnormalities; because these
findings have a benign prognosis, treat-
ment can only do harm. More broadly
defined, overdiagnosis happens when a
diagnostic label is applied to people with
mild symptoms or at very low risk of future
illness, for whom the label and subsequent
treatment may do more harm than good
[3].
Among the drivers of overdiagnosis are
technological developments producing ev-
er more sensitive imaging and biomarker
tests, and changing disease and treatment
thresholds that medicalize more people
[4]. For example, detection of indolent
breast lesions is now recognised as an
established risk of mammography screen-
ing [5]; widened definitions of chronic
kidney disease label many asymptomatic
seniors as diseased [6]; lowered thresholds
increase concerns about overdiagnosis of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [7];
and more sensitive imaging methods are
causing the treatment of large numbers of
potentially benign pulmonary emboli [8].
It’s important to note there is a complex
interrelationship between overdiagnosis
and overtreatment—which can occur for
many reasons other than overdiagnosis. If
we consider the narrow definition of
overdiagnosis—where someone is diag-
nosed with a ‘‘disease’’ that will not
progress or harm them—overdiagnosis
generally leads to overtreatment. Writing
about overdiagnosis in 1998, Black de-
scribed the cycle of increasingly sensitive
tests causing more ‘‘pseudo-disease’’ to be
diagnosed and conventionally treated [9].
Because prognosis of ‘‘pseudo-disease’’ is
generally benign, there is a perception that
patients do well on treatment, reinforcing
belief in the value of treatment to the
widened patient pool, and in turn fuelling
further overtreatment [9]. In other situa-
tions, inappropriate overtreatment can
occur where there is a legitimate clinical
diagnosis, and in some circumstances a
degree of overtreatment may be warrant-
ed, for instance, the early use of parenteral
antibiotics in someone suspected of having
bacterial meningitis.
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Summary Points
N Overdiagnosis and related overtreatment are increasingly recognised as major
problems.
N ‘‘Positive’’ average results from trials of treatments can mask situations where
many participants at low risk of disease may receive no benefit.
N The evaluation of diagnostic tests usually involves assessing how well tests
detect presence versus absence of a certain disease—rather than how well they
detect clinically meaningful stages of disease.
N Changes to disease definitions typically do not involve evaluation of potential
harms of overdiagnosis, and are often conducted by heavily conflicted panels.
N We offer suggestions for improving the way evidence is produced, analysed,
and interpreted, to help combat overdiagnosis and related overtreatment.
These include routine consideration of overdiagnosis and related overtreatment
in studies of tests and treatments, and clearer stratification by baseline risk to
identify treatment thresholds where benefits are likely to outweigh harms.
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Considering the broader definition of
overdiagnosis—involving the medicaliza-
tion of people with mild problems or at
very low risk of disease—it becomes more
difficult to define what constitutes subse-
quent overtreatment. Those judgements
will depend on a complex mix of evidence
about individual risk, prognosis, and
treatment benefit–harm calculations, com-
bined with the personal values and
preferences inherent in any decision-mak-
ing. Cognisant of this complex context,
this essay explores how the production,
analysis, and interpretation of evidence—
whether from individual studies or system-
atic reviews—might be improved to better
inform those judgements, and to better
understand and combat the challenges of
overdiagnosis and related overtreatment.
Average Therapeutic Trial
Results Can Mislead
It’s widely recognised that average
treatment effects estimated by systematic
reviews of primary therapeutic trials don’t
really apply to any single patient, and an
average benefit can mask both positive
and negative effects in different patient
subgroups. This leads to treatment of
patients who don’t benefit, and may suffer
harms. Almost two decades ago, advocates
of the then emerging evidence-based
approach stressed the importance of a
nuanced application of evidence from
primary trials and systematic reviews for
individuals, taking into account a person’s
absolute risk of an outcome and the need
to weigh up potential benefits and harms
[10].
More recently Kent and colleagues
cited examples where positive clinical trial
results masked a lack of meaningful benefit
for those at lower risks of illness, including
trials involving statins, anticoagulant ther-
apies, and some common surgical proce-
dures [11]. The authors argued that this
problem of trials masking the ‘‘heteroge-
neity of treatment effects’’ can result in
guidelines that promote overtreatment, as
well as undertreatment, and they recom-
mended estimation of treatment effects
after stratifying trial participants according
to baseline risk.
Similarly, in a presentation to the
inaugural Preventing Overdiagnosis Con-
ference in 2013, Llewelyn re-analysed trial
data involving medication for diabetic
microalbuminuria and identified subsets
of trial participants according to their
specific disease stage, finding that many
people were likely being treated without
benefit [12]. The hope is that better
stratification of people by disease stage,
or baseline risk of relevant outcomes, will
enable better identification of who will
benefit and who will be harmed by an
intervention, potentially informing the
development of more appropriate diag-
nostic cut-points and treatment thresholds,
ultimately reducing overdiagnosis and
overtreatment.
We Need More Nuanced
Evaluation of Tests, Too
Just as with the average treatment
effects of therapeutics, the average accu-
racy of a test does not apply to everyone
[13]. Moreover, disease is often not simply
‘‘present’’ or ‘‘absent’’, but rather exists on
a continuous scale [14]. Hence, assessing a
diagnostic test is more complex than
simply knowing its average sensitivity and
specificity or how well it detects the
presence or absence of a disease [13].
There is a need to know how well
diagnostic tests detect subsets of clinically
meaningful, as opposed to non-meaning-
ful, abnormalities or disease stages. In
other words, it’s important to diagnose or
identify the spectrum of individuals for
whom a disease label and associated
intervention will do more good than harm.
A more sophisticated approach is par-
ticularly needed when assessing newer,
highly sensitive tests—often more costly
and burdensome to perform—that can
identify earlier, milder, or indolent abnor-
malities or disease stages. For example,
computed tomography pulmonary angi-
ography has led to a dramatic increase in
detection of small ‘‘sub-segmental’’ pul-
monary emboli, of uncertain clinical
significance, with emerging debate over
whether many people are being treated
unnecessarily with anticoagulants [8]. As a
result, pulmonary embolism has been
described as a ‘‘model for the modern
phenomenon of overdiagnosis’’ [1].
The Benefits and Harms of
Expanding Disease Definitions
A recent investigation of panels that
change disease definitions found that while
lowering diagnostic thresholds and widen-
ing definitions are common, few panels
reported on the potential harms of ex-
panding the numbers of people who
qualify for a diagnosis [4]. Among panels
that had made recent changes to the
definitions of common conditions—such
as hypertension, attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, and myocardial infarc-
tion—the study also found widespread
conflicts of interest. For panel publications
that included disclosure sections, around
75% of panel members disclosed multiple
financial ties to pharmaceutical companies
active in the relevant therapeutic area.
Without doubt there are many cases
where lower diagnostic thresholds and
earlier diagnosis and treatment of disease
or risk factors can improve health out-
comes. For example, early diagnosis of
hypertension helps precipitate preventive
lifestyle changes or medication use. How-
ever, increasing medicalization may bring
harms as well as benefits, as many others
have highlighted in debates about ‘‘disease
mongering’’ [15]. When, for example,
conditions such as restless legs syndrome
or female sexual dysfunction are construct-
Box 1. Summary of Suggestions for Improving the Evidence
Base to Combat Overdiagnosis and Related Overtreatment
1. Routine consideration of overdiagnosis and related overtreatment in the
introduction and discussion sections of primary studies and systematic review
articles about tests and treatments
2. More condition-specific studies and reviews on the risk of overdiagnosis and
related overtreatment—e.g., diagnosis of pulmonary embolism
3. More rigorous routine evaluation of potential harms of treatments, tests, and
changes to disease definitions
4. In studies and reviews of studies of therapies, clearer stratification by baseline
risk, to better identify treatment thresholds where benefits are likely to
outweigh harms
5. In studies and reviews of studies of test accuracy, more clarity about which
target condition or spectrum of a disease is being considered, with a shift from a
dichotomous ‘‘disease/no disease’’ frame to a ‘‘spectrum of disease severity’’
frame, and a linking of test accuracy to consequences for treatment and patient
outcomes
6. Panels that review and change disease definitions that are free of conflicts, and
routinely consider evidence for potential harms as well as potential benefits of
the changes they propose
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ed and promoted as being widespread and
severe [15], there are legitimate concerns
that diagnosing and treating those with
mild problems may do them more harm
than good.
Improving the Evidence Base to
Combat Overdiagnosis and
Overtreatment
As a matter of urgency, the potential for
overdiagnosis and related overtreatment
should be routinely considered for inclu-
sion in the introduction and discussion
sections of reports of studies of therapies,
studies of diagnostic test accuracy, system-
atic reviews of those studies, clinical
guidelines, and changes to disease defini-
tions (Box 1). Second, there is a clear need
for more research—both original studies
and reviews of studies—into the nature
and extent of overdiagnosis and related
overtreatment within specific conditions—
as, for example, has occurred with studies
on the risks associated with mammogra-
phy [5]. Third, the potential harms
associated with new treatments and tests,
or expanded disease definitions, demand
much greater attention in primary studies
and reviews.
For evaluation of treatments, more
clarity is required about the specific
definitions of diseases being treated in
primary treatment studies and subsequent
systematic reviews. As per the recommen-
dations of Kent and colleagues [11],
clearer stratification of groups at varying
degrees of baseline risk or disease stage is
needed, to better identify treatment
thresholds at which the harms of treatment
start to outweigh benefits. Sometimes this
will require re-analysis of large (e.g.,
pooled individual participant) datasets,
underscoring the need for access to raw
data from trials.
For primary studies and reviews of
studies of diagnostic test accuracy, there
is a need to make explicit exactly which
stages or spectrum of a target disease is
being considered—also referred to as the
‘‘target condition’’ [14]. Where possible, it
may be desirable to shift the paradigm
from a dichotomous frame—disease pres-
ence versus absence—to thinking about a
spectrum of disease severity. Moreover,
when diagnostic studies show improved
detection (or exclusion) of specific disease
stages, researchers should try to link the
consequences of such improved diagnostic
accuracy to subsequent treatment deci-
sions. Ideally, the consequences of such
changed treatment decisions for patient
outcomes might also be addressed [16].
Such elaborations to conventional diag-
nostic test accuracy studies would help
identify at what diagnostic disease spec-
trum thresholds subsequent treatments will
do more good than harm.
And, finally, the need to improve the
process of disease definition—with aware-
ness of the dangers of overdiagnosis and
overtreatment—is being increasingly ac-
cepted, with international organisations,
including the Guidelines International
Network, currently looking to develop
new guidance. While a detailed debate
will ensue in coming years, we believe
several key principles might underpin the
reform of how disease definitions are
changed: panel members should be free
of financial and reputational conflicts of
interest; strong evidence, ideally from
randomised trial data, should demonstrate
that the use of new criteria will meaning-
fully reduce mortality and/or morbidity;
and potential benefits and potential harms
of labelling and treatment using the new
criteria should be explicitly investigated
and reported.
Conclusions
We offer these suggestions as part of the
wider scientific debate underway on how
to safely and fairly wind back the harms of
too much medicine [17]. We are hopeful
that a heightened attention to the dangers
of overdiagnosis and related overtreatment
may lead to an enhanced evidence base on
these topics. This, in turn, will help
produce fairer, more rational, and less
wasteful health care systems, built on a
reformed process of disease definition that
offers diagnostic labels and medical inter-
ventions only to those likely to benefit
from them.
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